Sudan is located in northeastern Africa, bordered by Egypt to the north, Chad to the west, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the southeast, and the Red Sea to the northeast. It is rich with oil, iron ore, copper, chromium, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, and gold, nearly all of which is privately owned or managed by foreign capitalists.

Human beings have lived continuously in the area now know as Sudan for at least 50,000 years. The land is mostly desert or arid plains, carved by the Nile River, which flows south to north. In the Nile Valley, beneath Lake Nasser, rests Jebel Sahaba, an ancient burial site. There lies the oldest known military conflict, a battle sparked by climate-driven scarcity around 12,000 BC— roughly 10,000 years before the Great Pyramids of Egypt, over 11,000 years before the founding of Rome.

Today, Sudan is home to about 50 million people. Two-thirds belong to the "Arabized" ethnic majority; the rest retain indigenous "African" tribal customs and identity, including the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit peoples. These groups live under apartheid-like conditions, facing discrimination and violence.

In Arabic, "bilād as-sūdān" means "land of the blacks." Prior to the mass settlement of Sudan in the 14th century by Arabic-speaking nomads, the land was long-known by the name Nubia. To the ancient peoples of neighboring Egypt, Canaan, and Assyria, the people of the region were known as the Kush.

THE CIVIL WARS

Sudan gained independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, after nearly 30 years of riots, strikes, and sporadic anti-colonial resistance. In 1958, CIA-backed generals led by Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the civilian government and established military rule. Almost immediately, northern and southern Sudan clashed. The First Sudanese Civil War (1955–1972) erupted when the northern ruling classes sought to maintain control over oil and mineral resources in the southern, predominantly proletarian "African" regions. The Arabized ruling class laid the groundwork for years of racially motivated oppression in the country.

A million people died in the long Civil War. In October 1964, during the war, protests erupted in Khartoum, uniting angry liberals and the Sudanese Communist Party. They overthrew Abboud and established civilian rule. In 1969, Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) seized power. He was supported by Libya, China, and the US. Nimeiry signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, establishing the Southern Sudan Autonomous Region and extending political rights to animist and Christian minorities, though without economic self-determination. Almost immediately, the SSU embraced Islamism and Pan-Arabism, shifting away from socialism and the Soviet Union. In 1971, the government attempted to take control of labor unions, arresting and threatening Communist Party members. That July, Communist officers failed to take control of the state via coup d'etat. The Soviet-aligned coup plotters were assassinated, marking the beginning of a long retreat for revolutionary left-wing politics in Sudan.

The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) began when the northern government imposed Islamic law on the south and sought to control the region’s oil fields. This decision overturned the rights established by the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. In 1989, Omar al-Bashir seized power in a military coup. More than 2 million people died in the long war over oil. Despite adopting the rhetoric of Pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism, Bashir's government in the 1980s and 90s relied heavily on trade and funding from the US and NATO-aligned countries (including China at the time), driving their push to refine oil at a higher rate within a nationalist politics that denied African tribes' right to self-determination.

The US-led War on Terror reshaped regional alliances. Bashir allied with the US, but this would not help him in the coming years. Sanctions soon followed, crippling his ability to operate internationally due to the bloody repression in Sudan and his ties to groups like al-Qaeda.

WAR IN THE WEST: DARFUR AND THE JANJAWEEDS

Darfur is one of Sudan’s least fertile regions, with a population of around 7.5 million and an area approximately the size of Texas. Aside from the lush Marra Mountains (Jebel Marra), the region receives little rain. Seasonal precipitation from June to September supports all agriculture in the region, primarily millet, sorghum, and tobacco.

The area is home to many communities and tribes, distinguished primarily by their language and methods of subsistence. Broadly speaking, the Fur live in the center of Darfur, the Tunjur in the north, the Masalit to the west, and the Zaghawa in the northwest. These are the peoples known as the "African" tribes.

Nomadic Arabic-speaking shepherds and herders have lived for centuries in the arid stretch between Chad, Libya, and Sudan. They share the land with sedentary farmers and the semi-nomadic Zaghawa tribes of northwest Darfur. The Arab nomads, known as the Baggaras, are further divided into sub-tribes such as the Messiria and the Rezeigat. These nomads are primarily cattle and horse herders, relying on grazing land for survival.

The division of people into “Arab” and “African” tribes largely stems from the Chad-Libya war. Muammar al-Gaddafi fueled Arab chauvinism among the Baggaras, some of whom, like the Messiria, already saw themselves as “dark ones” and “red ones.” In the mid-80s, Gaddafi armed the Baggaras and convinced many they had the right to overthrow Chad’s US-backed president, Hissène Habré. When they failed, the militias fled to Darfur, just as a deadly drought began to ravage the region. The water-poor province now hosted tens of thousands of desperately poor herders, heavily armed with machine guns and a racial ideology.

In 2003, violence erupted in Darfur. The Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), led by the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit, rose up against the government, seizing most of Jebel Marra. The SLA allied with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to demand regional autonomy for Darfur. Together, they advanced on several cities, sparking an inter-ethnic insurgency against Bashir’s regime. Bashir enlisted Baggara-led militias, supplying arms and money to tribal leaders. He exploited the rift between herders and farmers, turning the former into killers of the latter. These armed men became known as the Janjaweed—“devils on horseback.”

The Janjaweed, officially known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), came under the direct command of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). They fought not only in Darfur but also against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. As the war in the south stalled, the Janjaweed escalated their violence against Darfurian villages. Gaddafi armed both the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Janjaweed.

In 2005, the United States, through USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, and other agencies, supported sectarian, "pro-independence" groups and programs across the south. The long Second Civil War ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which passed in a questionable referendum with 98.8% approval. South Sudan was born. Since then, it has become a vassal state to both US and Chinese industrial interests. The world’s newest country, half its population is under 18, and nearly half suffers from malnutrition. Despite vast oil reserves, the government lacks the political will to nationalize them, leaving its resources open to exploitation by international capitalists. To the north, the Bashir government lost one of its most lucrative revenue streams.

WHY DO PEOPLE JOIN THE RSF/JANJAWEEDS?

The RSF has deployed across the country as a mobile force, terrorizing civilians with massacres, rape, and persecution. Why? Joining the militia is one of the few paths to stability. After 2010, austerity cuts slashed public spending, and the Janjaweed seized control of gold mines in Jebel Amir. The war in Darfur—and beyond—has opened opportunities to loot money, goods, and livestock from slaughtered and displaced communities. Ethnic cleansing has a clear economic motive, driven by a lack of jobs due to uneven economic development. The United Nations holds al-Bashir’s regime responsible for at least 400,000 deaths and millions of displaced people. Much of this has been carried out by his paramilitary allies.

The RSF receives arms primarily from China, Russia, and Belgium. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, the Sudanese government deployed the RSF to fight in Yemen. This support boosted the RSF’s influence in Sudanese politics and drew young recruits with promises of high pay for impoverished families. Children now make up 40% of the militia.

The RSF has weaponized their socioeconomic marginalization, using looting as revenge against the "urban rich." Most victims are farmers or laborers. The RSF are mercenaries—an impoverished population that has made war their trade, a lumpenproletariat for sale to any political cause. In September 2013, the RSF was unleashed on peaceful demonstrators protesting the Sudanese government's removal of subsidies on basic goods. The crackdown left over 170 dead, exposing the regime’s reliance on the militia to crush dissent.

In 2015, convinced of the RSF's effectiveness as a counterinsurgency force, the al-Bashir regime made it Sudan’s primary force for patrolling borders and blocking migrant movement, as part of its deal with the European Union (EU). The RSF received EU funds to curb migration flows from Sudan to Europe. The EU also helped build detention facilities for migrants and supplied Sudanese border forces with cameras, scanners, and servers to register refugees. A law passed in January 2017 formally integrated the RSF into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This paradoxically made the RSF both autonomous and part of the army, while remaining under the command of President Omar al-Bashir.

On February 27, 2017, Sudanese police violently dispersed hundreds of Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers protesting hikes in processing fees. The police arrested dozens, sentenced them to 40 lashes, and fined them $800. This is the essence of European interest in groups like the RSF: arm paramilitaries in Africa to trap refugees before they reach the Mediterranean.

THE REVOLUTION

In December 2018, a new revolution began in Sudan after bread prices tripled. Protests erupted in Atbara, quickly spreading to Khartoum and beyond. Led by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), demonstrators rallied under the slogan "Tasgut bas" (just fall, that’s all), staging day and night protests and sit-ins, while seeking diplomatic support from the diaspora.

The same officials—Ahmed Harun, former interior minister and mayor of Al-Obeid—who oversaw the massacres of the Massalit people during the early days of the Darfur genocide, were still commanding brutal repression of 2018 protesters by the RSF. This explains the slogan in recent demonstrations: "Ali Osman, you coward! Nafi Ali Nafi, you're useless (ma nafi)."

The core demands were clear: dismantle al-Bashir’s decades of authoritarian rule and establish a more democratic system. Protesters called for a transitional government, an end to RSF operations, accountability for human rights violations, and justice for the victims of al-Bashir’s regime. These demands for his removal ultimately led to a military coup by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

After al-Bashir’s ousting in 2019, hopes for a peaceful transition to civilian rule were shattered when the "Transitional Military Council" failed to convene civilian elections as promised. This failure sparked the current war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

From where we stand, only a sweeping social revolution can end the violence in Sudan. Seize the oil and gold, and use the wealth to fund land reform in the West and South. That is the only way to bring the conflict to a real conclusion. But Sudan's political dependence on foreign powers makes this process impossible. Only a Pan-African war of independence could shatter the grip of foreign capital, allowing Sudanese people to unite for their common good, instead of slaughtering each other over their own resources. This can happen. These are not just problems for the Sudanese. The essential dynamics of world capitalism are visible in starkest relief there.

We reached out to Sudanese revolutionaries about the state of the revolution and civil war.

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R: Ok, so first I just want to give the context of why we're doing this interview. Obviously, there have been a series uprisings happening around the world, including in Sudan. As far as what Westerners know, or are up to date on, Sudan is a blind spot. We're not very aware or educated about the current situation. There's a lot less news coming out. So the purpose of this interview is to help, particularly Westerners, get a better understanding of the current situation in Sudan.

If you want to introduce and contextualize yourselves, and your relationship to Sudan, do you currently live there, whatever is most comfortable for you...

Alaa: My name is Alaa. I’m a lawyer, and I’ve been living in Rwanda since July 2023. I work providing legal aid for Sudanese refugees here. I’ve also recently been to Sudan, so I have a good understanding of the situation there. I know it’s hard for people in the West to grasp what’s happening in Sudan. The timeline is complicated—there’s the revolution, the transitional period, the military coup, and now the war. The relationship between all these events isn’t very clear to many outside Sudan.

Before I begin, I want to clarify something about the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the main parties in the war. The RSF is a military group that was used by the government to repress people in Darfur. They were directly involved in the genocide in Darfur. The RSF has long been a tool of the government to carry out repression. What many people don’t realize is that the RSF has been receiving support from the European Union through their migration control programs. The European Union has backed them, which has allowed the RSF to strengthen its forces. So now, we’re facing a group that was essentially kept alive and empowered by foreign support, particularly from the EU and the West.

R: We know a little bit about the Professional Associations, we've heard about them. Can you talk about what their role was in the uprising and what the current status of them is?

Alaa: The Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) is the Sudanese version of syndicate coalitions. It’s made up of independent syndicates from various professions—doctors, engineers, journalists, and others. When the revolution began, Sudan’s traditional workers' political party had already been co-opted by the regime. Or, more accurately, it had been weakened over 30 years of military dictatorship and Islamic rule.

This created a vacuum and a need for an organization to lead the revolution. The syndicates, through the Sudanese Professional Association, stepped into that role and led the revolution. But as the revolution gained momentum, the Resistance Committees emerged. These were neighborhood-based groups that initially pressured the SPA to meet the revolution’s demands. Eventually, the Resistance Committees took on the leadership themselves. So, in recent years, the real leadership of the revolution wasn’t the Sudanese Professional Association, but rather the neighborhood Resistance Committees.

Ibrahim: Let me add some context to Sudan’s history: Since the British left, military control has dominated the country. The Sudanese Armed Forces trace their origins to British colonial rule, and just two years after the British left, the military seized power. In fact, today marks the anniversary of Sudan’s first revolution against military rule, which began with the Khartoum uprising, led by another syndicate. This syndicate demanded new elections, but the transitional military council held onto power for 16 more years.

Then another uprising erupted, calling for civilian rule—but that was followed by yet another military coup. This new military government worked to dismantle the popular syndicates and replace them with a government-aligned, pseudo-union movement.

The most recent revolution began with protests against food prices. It started as a grassroots movement in response to the rising price of bread, but it quickly grew. Those who resisted the government formed their own structure—a more centralized organization to coordinate demonstrations and marches—and that became the Professionals Association. Eventually, they began organizing their own protests and issuing statements condemning the military. After Bashir was ousted, the junta took control, and shortly after, the political parties aligned with the Professionals Association began fighting for influence, even attempting to dissolve the SPA.

The revolution had its share of opportunists, which is why, when the second coup occurred—leading to the war—the Resistance Committees rejected the SPA’s leadership in the fight against the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and instead embraced the leadership of the neighborhood committees.

R: What would you say have been some of the biggest obstacles dealing with counter-revolutionary forces following the uprising?

Ahmed Isam: If I may add, the counter-revolution was made possible because the December revolution ended in a compromise between the military junta and the opportunists within the revolution itself. These opportunists became part of the government, creating a serious division within the revolution. The radical left rejected this arrangement and refused to collaborate with the government. Meanwhile, the EU and the US supported the coalition government between civilians and the military, calling it "a successful model for peace-building and democratic transition." But most Sudanese had already seen how the military could control politics. The revolution's leaders had become puppets of the armed forces, holding press conferences and meetings in places like Paris and the US. That was the first key issue: a deep division within the revolution. The counter-revolution was quick to exploit this rift.

Then came the issue of justice. The regime killed over 300 people during the protests, and more than 1,000 were still missing. The government created a fake committee to "investigate" these deaths, but it led to nothing. The people demanded justice. Even after the "transitional" government was formed, the demonstrations never stopped.

Then, Trump announced that sanctions on Sudan under Bashir could only be lifted if Sudan agreed to normalize relations with Israel. This, too, was deeply unpopular in Sudan. Of course, there are neoliberal forces and certain groups pushing for normalization, but by and large, the idea remains highly unpopular among the majority of Sudanese.

The counter-revolutionaries capitalized on these international pressures and threats to divide the movement even further.

Ibrahim: Another major obstacle facing the revolution has been timing. COVID struck right in the middle of the revolutionary process, triggering a severe economic crisis in an already fragile Sudan. The counter-revolutionary forces invested heavily in worsening this crisis, driving the transitional government toward failure. They also exploited historical tensions between rural and urban areas to fuel tribal conflicts. The RSF, for instance, is closely tied to some tribal interests in the east. They leveraged these connections to block key infrastructure, such as the ports in the east, deliberately deepening the country’s economic struggles. They played different groups against each other, using ethnic chauvinist rhetoric to mobilize support.

The counter-revolutionaries framed the economic crisis not as a result of global dynamics or broader issues, but as the work of corrupt, secretive elites—small groups of individuals. They spread conspiracy theories to reinforce this narrative.

R: Can you talk about the current role of the RSF and how Sudan civilians are responding to them?

Ibrahim: The RSF is etched in the collective memory of the Sudanese people as the regime’s enforcer. It is remembered for its role in the 2003 genocide in Darfur and again in 2011. It was the force that brutally suppressed protesters in the early months of the revolution. Eventually, the RSF tried to rebrand itself. During the period of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the military was supposed to govern for two years, after which civilian rule would take over. But in those two years, the military worked to weaken any civilian counter-power. That’s when the RSF "aligned" itself -- cynically -- with the civilian side. They claimed to be the true counter-power to the junta, with Hemedti, the RSF commander, presenting himself as the "guardian of the revolution."

And that’s when the war truly began. In the early days, it was pure chaos. Ultimately, the fighting became a battle between the official Sudanese Army and the RSF. The initial clashes were deeply influenced by the ethnic makeup of the RSF, as they primarily recruit from tribal groups in the western parts of Sudan—groups historically used by the state for ethnic cleansing against African tribes in Darfur. In the first days of the war, the RSF swiftly launched another genocidal campaign against African tribes in Darfur.

The RSF specifically targeted the Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. These attacks have left the Sudanese people in a dire situation, facing two grim choices: either the RSF wins, continuing their massacres on a massive scale, or the "lesser evil"—the Sudanese Army—takes control. Unfortunately, the second option is the popular one, despite the fact that everyone knows it would mean a return to military dictatorship for another 30 years. These are the two stark choices facing the Sudanese people right now.

To put it plainly, the RSF has built its army on a foundation of racism, creating vast racist militias across the country. And that has set everything back.

R: And are people responding to this dichotomy in any way?

Alaa: Yes. I don’t know the exact figures, because there are significant obstacles to analyzing the situation, including what [the other comrade] mentioned about the militarization of consciousness. At one point, the revolutionary forces were fighting against all forms of repression—fighting the RSF, the army, the Transitional Military Council... essentially, fighting the entire political system. Now, they’re faced with a very limited, binary choice. The RSF, through massive and systematic attacks on working-class Sudanese communities, including farming communities, is trying to reshape the country demographically. So, a population that has never before resorted to armed struggle, or used violence to fight back, is now relying on one of their enemies to fight the other.

So, there are remnants of the Resistance Committees that have aligned with the army, along with factions within them that oppose the war altogether. Then, there are the traditional political parties, whose only aim is to maintain or return to power. Some of these parties seem to be aligning with the RSF, hoping that the RSF might create opportunities for them.

The RSF is now directly attacking the revolutionary leadership in the streets. During the war, the Resistance Committees have morphed into something like humanitarian aid groups, now calling themselves “Emergency Response Groups.” This seems to be the only way to mobilize while still maintaining a connection to the revolutionary forces. In recent weeks and months, we've seen two parties begin arresting and attacking these humanitarian groups, which are essentially running soup kitchens. So, we now face two main enemies of the revolution, but we don’t feel like we have a choice. We have to find a new way forward and rethink what comes next.

Ahmed Isam: The Janjaweed militia, which is how the RSF is mostly known in Sudan, translates to "armed men on horseback" or, in US parlance, perhaps "cowboys." The Janjaweed were partly founded by Omar Bashir’s regime to fight armed resistance groups in Darfur. These militias have been funded by the European Union through the "Khartoum Process," established in 2013 in Malta as a deal between Egypt and Sudan. At the time, Bashir funneled some of this funding to the Janjaweed paramilitaries to protect himself from the army. Later, Bashir sent RSF forces to fight in Yemen alongside Saudi forces against the Ansar Allah guerrillas in Sanaa. This became a major source of funding for the RSF, as they were receiving money not only from the EU but also from the Saudi monarchy.

The RSF is now heavily funded by Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi, partly to exploit Sudan’s vast mineral resources. The RSF controls the gold mines entirely, and these resources are sent directly to the EU, with none of the proceeds passing through normal tax channels.

The RSF has a long history of directly attacking supply lines, looting food and goods to starve and weaken the cities, which are the centers of the revolutionary movement. As a result, the Resistance Committees have mostly been displaced into neighboring countries. At one point, the frontline fighters of the revolution—known as الغاضبون ("The Angry")—who operated somewhat like Western black blocs, were often killed while fighting against the coup. Some of them have taken up arms by joining the military to fight the RSF. After all, war is just a continuation of politics by other means, and this is how the counter-revolution is advancing—by taking up arms against the people.

Ibrahim: The counter-revolution in Sudan is not just about the army. It was already in place during the period of the Transitional Military Council, and it’s crucial to understand the broader forces at play. The extractive goals of international capitalism are driven by a global alliance involving the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The RSF, as a militia, plays a central role in maintaining the extractive dynamics of Sudan’s economy. So, the Sudanese revolution isn’t just up against the RSF—it’s facing these international powers as well. The UAE supplies the RSF with weapons. Now, the RSF is openly claiming that they are fighting "Islamic terrorists," accusing the Sudanese army of supplying arms and goods to Hamas, and positioning themselves as essential to Western powers in their global war on Islamic terrorism.

On the other hand, the Sudanese army is receiving drones from Iran. In this small example, we see how Sudan is becoming a battleground for regional powers, specifically Iran and the UAE (and by extension, the US). Amid this conflict, Sudan is fighting to protect its sovereignty—its control over its land, farming, resources, and its democratic future in general.

R: What could be a positive outcome from this situation?

Ahmed Isam: I don’t know. All I can say is that the Sudanese resistance structures, built over the past five years, now need to be reorganized around a new common vision. Whether in the diaspora or within Sudan, everything must be focused on ending the war and creating a new revolutionary framework and strategy.

Ibrahim: My biggest fear is that the racial mobilization in this war will foster a lasting culture of separatism in Sudan, where people are expected to stay within their own regions. We need a peaceful resolution, and we need it immediately. The war isn’t just about killing—it’s about famine, cholera, yellow fever. Epidemics are spreading, and many are dying. The war is expanding, and the world is starting to forget, dismissing it as "just another conflict in Africa."

The Sudanese conflict and revolution cannot be separated from the support structures fueling the war. This isn’t just another conflict in Sudan—it’s part of a broader wave of extractive policies and struggles led by the US and Israel, impacting the entire region. Revolutionary forces still exist, and whenever the revolution is criticized, every side claims to represent it. No one can openly oppose the revolution; everyone feels the need to lay claim to it. In that, there is a small crack—a tiny opening through which the revolution might survive the war, through a peaceful resolution, and endure in memory after the war is over.

Interview with Alaa, Youth in Action; Ibrahim, Sudan Uprising; and Ahmed Isam, Sudan Uprising